The Change of Performance of Chinese Large-sized Private Enterprises and Its Determinants (2004-2006) by Liu, Xiaoxuan & Zhao, Shiyong
The Change of Performance of 
Chinese Large-sized Private 
Enterprises and Its Determinants 
(2004-2006)
Xiaoxuan Liu and Shiyong  Zhao*1
Using the data collected by All China Federation of Industry 
and Commerce, this paper studies the change of performance of 
Chinese large-sized private enterprises and its possible deter- 
minants. The study finds that the financing difficulty of private 
firms, due to Chinese government's control policy, is the major 
factor resulting in the worsening performance of these large 
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I. Introduction
Chinese private enterprises have been developing very rapidly in 
the 1990s and early 21st century. From 1989 to 2002, the 
registered capital and the sales revenue of Chinese private enter- 
prises have been growing at an annual average rate of more than 
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50 percent.1 By 2006, the number of private firms has reached 
4.65 million, and private enterprises have contributed more than a 
half to the GDP of China.2
Compared with the fast growth of Chinese private enterprises in 
the 1990s and beginning of 21
st century, the growth has been 
slowing down since 2003. From 1990 to 2002, the sales revenue of 
Chinese private enterprises grew at an annual average rate of 59.75 
percent.3 From 2003 to 2005, the sales revenue grew at an average 
annual rate of 28.34 percent, which is much lower than that of 
1990s. The growth rate of value-added of Chinese large-sized 
private firms was also slowing down since 2003, it was 65.21 
percent in 2003, but was only 42.43 percent in 2005.4
Under this background, our question is: Why has the growth of 
private firms been slowing down since 2003? And what is the 
change of performance in terms of technical efficiency and profit 
margin of Chinese private firms in recent years? It seems that the 
performance declines, but we need data to confirm (or refute) it. 
The next question is: If the efficiency and profitability of private 
enterprises also decreased, then what are the factors that have 
resulted in the changes? Is it due to market fluctuations, govern- 
ment policies, or any other factors? This question could best be 
answered empirically. Fortunately, surveys of All China Federation 
of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC) provide us with data on 
Chinese large private firms for several consecutive years. With the 
firm-level data at hand, we are able to measure the change of 
performance of Chinese large private firms and figure out factors 
that may have resulted in the change of their performance. 
In 2003 and 2004, the Chinese government launched a round of 
so-called “macro-control.” Under the macro-control policies, com- 
mercial banks were asked to cut loans and reclaim loans already 
released. And many projects in iron and steel, aluminum and 
cement, etc. were halted or canceled. The macro-control policy 
coincided in time with the downturn of Chinese large-sized private 
firms. Is there any correlation between these two events? By our 
conjecture, there should be some connections between the two 
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events, not just by chance. We hypothesize the macro-control 
policy, with an emphasis on credit contracting, had an adverse 
effect on private firms. Based on it, to what extent the large private 
firms were affected under the policy, and are there any other 
factors that may have contributed to the change of performance of 
Chinese large private firms in recent years? For all above, we will 
try to test and find the reasons for such performance changes. 
In recent years, many studies in this area focus on companies 
listed on the stock market, measuring their performance and 
analyzing the determinants. Also there are some studies concerning 
the comparison of performance and efficiency of firms with different 
ownerships. For Chinese private enterprises, a lot of studies focus 
on the governance structure of private firms theoretically, such as 
Zhang (2006). Chen and Cao (2007) studies several cases of 
Chinese private firms, they point out that the institutional environ- 
ment determines the development of Chinese private enterprises 
during the past two decades. But very few scholars do empirical 
studies on private enterprises.
ACFIC has an annual report on the development of Chinese 
large-sized private enterprises. But these reports just simply 
described the general statistical figures, lacked a systematic 
analysis for several consecutive years, thus failed to measure the 
changes of performance and to find the underlying determinants. 
Up to now, there are almost no empirical studies that focus on 
Chinese private enterprises, perhaps due to the unavailability of 
data. Our study in the present paper will do such empirical work 
to fill this void. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Part II explains the 
source of the data and methodology used in this paper, and also 
gives the econometric models. Part III measures the performance of 
Chinese large-sized private enterprises, namely the technical 
efficiency and profit margin, to find the tendency of changes. Part 
IV provides the regression results and gives corresponding 
explanations. And Part V concludes the paper. 
II. Data and Methodology
The data used in this study come from the annual surveys of 
ACFIC. ACFIC and its local branches conduct surveys throughout 
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China on large-sized private enterprises annually. ACFIC first 
designs questionnaire, and private firms fill in the questionnaire 
voluntarily. According to the statistical standards of ACFIC, only 
those private firms with annual sales revenue exceeding or equal to 
RMB200 million are included in the survey from 2004 to 2006. In 
2004, the number of private firms satisfying this standard was 
2119, and the number in 2005 and 2006 was 2688 and 3191 
respectively. They are the leading and most competitive private 
firms of China. The dataset contains information on Chinese large 
private firms’ sales revenue, assets, profits, taxes, and employment, 
and also some information about conditions of firm’s financing and 
investment, marketing and management, and major problems they 
encounter during their development recently. 
We should point out that the dataset could be biased, since the 
surveys are not conducted on a random sampling or all-inclusive 
investigation, but on willingness of the respondents. Generally 
speaking, firms with good performance may be more likely to join 
in the survey, while those with bad performance may decline to do 
so. We think the problem should not be serious since the surveys 
generally cover most Chinese large-sized private enterprises in 
normal operation. Therefore, the datasets can, to a great extent, 
represent the population of Chinese large-sized private enterprises. 
Another limitation of the dataset is that it is not panel data, but 
cross-sections, even there are 3 years data. That is to say, not only 
the number of firms (as mentioned above), but also the firms 
covered in each year’s survey may differ. So what we have at hand 
are cross-sections of each year. So what we can do with the 
dataset is to do comparative static analysis, rather than dynamic 
analysis.5 Even so, we can still capture the change of performance 
of Chinese large-sized private firms for several consecutive years 
and try to figure out the determinants underlying the change. Of 
course, the underlying assumption is that each year’s cross-section 
can basically represent the population of Chinese large-sized private 
enterprises. The rationale is the all firms entering the sample must 
satisfy the RMB200 million threshold ― those firms with lower 
sales revenue than this threshold are excluded from the sample. 
5
One referee suggests that we should use only those firms that survived 
throughout the period to do dynamic analysis, but that would result in a 
too small sample size to do reliable analysis. 
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Therefore, even if certain sample selection bias exists, the sample 
can still represent most of the large-sized private enterprises. In 
addition, it is unnecessary to do deflations for the cross-sections 
since the effect of price fluctuations on all firms is the same.  
According to the dataset, Chinese large-sized private enterprises 
are operating in most manufacturing industries, and also wholesale 
and retailing sectors. Most of them are operating in labor-intensive 
industries, such as electrical machinery, textile and chemical fiber, 
clothing, shoes, and leather production, black metal and non- 
ferrous metal rolling and processing, general and special equipment 
manufacturing, etc. And there are also a lot of large-sized private 
enterprises lie in real estate and architecture industry. Very few of 
them are operating in finance and insurance, tobacco, culture, 
sports and entertainment industries.
In order to examine the change of performance of Chinese large 
private firms, we choose some indicators to represent performance. 
In general, efficiency and profitability of the firms are good 
measurements for enterprise’s performance. The two indicators are 
widely used to demonstrate a firm’s competitiveness and com- 
prehensive strength.
To measure efficiency of the private firms, we use the Farrell 
Input-Saving Measure of Technical Efficiency. By using Data 
Envelope Analysis (DEA), we can calculate the Farrell technical 
efficiency. The software we used is called OnFront. Efficiency 
measurement tells us about how well a firm is doing relative to 
some benchmark. By using input-saving measure of technical 
efficiency, we define the benchmark firms as those that produce a 
given level of goods or services with the fewest resources or lowest 
cost. Given our data, we calculate the technical efficiency for each 
industry from 2004 to 2006. 
We use profit margin, defined by net profit over sales revenue, to 
measure profitability of large private enterprises. We also calculate 
profit margin for each industry from 2004 to 2006. Apart from this 
definition of profit margin by net profit over sales revenue, ROA is 
another alternative. When we use ROA as the dependent variable, 
the R squared of the regression is lower than former one. That is 
because the statistics of net profits over sales revenue is more 
reliable, and it is determined by the firms’ competitiveness or 
characteristics of industries. But the statistics of total assets seems 
not good measurement in private firms, because the fluid assets 
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are very hard to compare with each other in distorted financial or 
capital market, and also there are no same rules for depreciation 
rates of assets between the firms and industries. Even in the same 
industry, due to the different sources of capital and statistical 
caliber, the balances of fluid assets are also incomparable. ROE 
(Rate of Return on Common Stockholders’ Equity) is also an 
alternative to measure profit margin, but it is not available from 
our data. 
Multiple linear regression models are used to test the possible 
factors that have resulted in the change of performance of Chinese 
large-sized private firms. Specifically, we use two models. The first 
one is a Cobb-Douglas production function regression model. In 
this model, sales revenue is treated as the dependent (explained) 
variable, which measures the output of firms, and fixed asset 
measures capital input, and number of employees in a firm 
measures labor input. In the second model, profit margin is used 
as the dependent variable. 
The Cobb-Douglas production function regression model is 
constructed as follows:
Y＝AK
αLβEXP (∑di Xi )   (1)
i
By taking natural logarithm at both sides of Equation (1), we get
lnY＝c＋α lnK＋β lnL＋∑di Xi   (2)
i
where Y is sales revenue,6 measuring output, and K and L are 
fixed assets and number of employees measuring capital and labor 
inputs respectively. α  and β measure the output elasticity of capital 
and labor. Xi measure all other variables that may affect output of 
a firm. 
The profit margin regression model is constructed as follows:7
6
Output is better measured by value-added of a firm, but due to the 
limitation of our data, we use sales revenue as a proxy. 
7
We did not include scale variable into the regression model. When we 
add such variable into models, the R squared only increased by one 
percentage point in one year, or no change in other years. The scale 
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π
＝c＋∑di Xi   (3)
Y i
where π is net profit of a firm, Y is sales revenue, and Xi measure 
all other variables that may affect the profit margin of a firm. The  
Xi variables meaning in each regression are as follows:
•Human resource represented by RLZY: proportion of employees 
with at least a bachelor’s degree in a firm
•Financing difficulty represented by Financing: for firms that 
believe financing difficulty is a major problem hindering their 
development, let the variable be 1, otherwise, 0
•Industry dummies represented by hy1-hy25: industry 1-25 are 
25 industry dummies, if a firm belongs to an industry, let the 
industry dummy be 1, otherwise, 0
•Source of capital for investment:
￭Source 1: for firms whose capital for investment come from 
self deposit, let the variable be 1, otherwise, 0
￭Source 2: for firms whose capital for investment come from 
borrowing from private channels, let the variable be 1, 
otherwise, 0
￭Source 3: for firms whose capital for investment come from 
bank loans, let the variable be 1, otherwise, 0
￭Source 4: for firms whose capital for investment come from 
capital market (direct financing), let the variable be 1, 
otherwise, 0
￭Source 5: for firms whose capital for investment come from 
other channels (except the above four), let the variable be 1, 
otherwise, 0
variable does not make much difference for the whole of the model, and 
after including the scale variable, the effect on financing is weakened, which 
implies that financing is to a great extent affected by scales. That is, larger 
firms are easier to obtain bank loans, and also easier to get opportunities 
to finance from the stock market. All this is consistent with our intuition. 
Since the effect of firm size on performance is not our main focus in this 
study, we omitted the scale variable, and focused on the effects of 
difference financing sources on firm performance. 
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TABLE 1





Food processing, food and beverage production 0.798 0.593 0.799
Textiles and chemical fiber manufacturing 0.719 0.678 0.792
Apparel, shoes, hat, and leather production 0.762 0.628 0.798
Timber processing, wood, bamboo, vine, and 
furniture 
0.803 0.589 0.730
Paper making, printing, and office products 0.815 0.539 0.711
Non-metal mineral products (incl. cement, glass, 
etc.)
0.818 0.713 0.568
Black metal, non-ferrous metal melting and 
rolling processing
0.673 0.611 0.512
Metal products 0.581 0.343 0.657
Oil processing, coking processing 0.681 0.519 0.379
Chemical materials and chemical products 
making
0.708 0.544 0.389
Pharmaceutical industry 0.805 0.718 0.820
Rubber and plastic products 0.558 0.654 0.813
General and special equipment manufacturing 0.694 0.399 0.738
Transportation equipment manufacturing 0.698 0.393 0.726
Electrical machinery, equipment and cable 
production
0.801 0.545 0.584
Telecom equipment, computer and other 
electrical equipment
0.617 0.565 0.547
Instrument and metering manufacturing 0.582 0.623 0.528
Architecture industry 0.754 0.510 0.428
Wholesale and retailing 0.359 0.374 0.429
Comprehensive (including investment) 0.722 0.629 0.406
III. Measuring Performance of Chinese Large-sized Private 
Enterprises
A. Change of Technical Efficiency: 2004-2006 
Table 1 shows that compared with 2004, in 2005, technical 
efficiency of Chinese large-sized private firms decreased in almost 
all industries, except rubber and plastic products and instrument 
and metering manufacturing industry. Technical efficiency declined 
very significantly in 2005 for industries like transportation 
equipment manufacturing, general and special equipment manu- 
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facturing, paper making, printing and office products making, 
electrical machinery, equipment and cable production, architecture 
industry and metal production industry. 
Compared with 2005, technical efficiency of large private firms 
rose in more than a half industries covered in Table 1, while 
decreased in less than a half industries in 2006. Technical 
efficiency rose dramatically in industries like metal production, 
transportation equipment manufacturing, general and special equip- 
ment manufacturing, while declined in industries like com- 
prehensive (including investment), chemical materials and chemical 
products making, and non-metal mineral products. If 2004 is 
treated as the benchmark, the technical efficiency in 2006 
decreased a little bit in about half industries.  
B. Change of Profit Margin: 2004-2006
Table 2 shows that, from 2004 to 2005, the profit margin of 
Chinese large-sized private enterprises decreased, and from 2005 to 
2006, it rose a little bit, but the profit margin in 2006 was still 
lower than that of 2004. Compared with 2004, the profit margin in 
2005 decreased dramatically in industries like non-metal mineral  
products, oil processing and coking, telecommunication equipment, 
computer and other electrical products and instrument and 
metering production. While profit margin rose in industries like ore 
mining, leasing and business services, lodging and restaurant, 
information transmission, computer service and software. Not many 
private firms are operating in these industries. 
Compared with 2005, profit margin dropped significantly in 2006 
in industries like ore mining, lodging and restaurant, food 
processing, and food and beverage production, architecture and 
paper making and printing. While the profit margin rose a little bit 
in 2006 in industries like oil processing and coking, rubber and 
plastic products, general and special equipment manufacturing and 
non-metal mineral products. 
It could be found that the number of industries covered in Table 
1 is fewer than that of Table 2. This is because DEA is a 
non-parametric method, which requires each industry contain a 
certain number of observations. Thus those industries with too few 
enterprises were omitted in the calculation of technical efficiency. 
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TABLE 2





Ore mining 9.19% 15.97% 10.96%
Production and supply of power, gas and water 6.83% 8.60% 6.92%
Electric machinery and cable, and cable 
manufacturing
6.02% 4.86% 5.15%
Real estate 8.67% 9.28% 8.18%
Textiles, and chemical fiber making 3.71% 3.66% 3.77%
Non-metal mineral products (incl. cement, glass, 
etc.)
11.24% 4.64% 5.88%
Clothing, shoes, caps, and leather 6.01% 5.81% 5.39%
Workmanship and other manufacturing products 4.30% 4.90% 3.96%
Black and non-ferrous metal melting, rolling and 
processing
5.20% 4.01% 4.52%
Chemical materials and chemical products making 4.87% 5.99% 5.45%
Architecture industry 3.94% 2.79% 0.58%
Transportation, warehousing and post 3.14% 2.84% 1.99%
Transportation equipment manufacturing 3.49% 3.67% 4.54%
Metal products 4.76% 3.51% 4.36%
Timber processing, and wood, bamboo, vine and 
furniture
4.61% 5.12% 5.25%
Agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery 5.45% 4.63% 3.73%
Wholesale and retailing 1.51% 1.47% 1.58%
Oil processing, and coking 7.81% 3.89% 6.19%
Food processing, and food and beverage production 4.79% 4.79% 1.90%
Telecom equipment, computer and other electronic 
products
3.98% 1.36% 1.44%
General and special equipment manufacturing 5.42% 5.05% 6.37%
Rubble and plastic products 5.17% 5.26% 6.80%
Information transmission, computer service and 
software
4.43% 7.15% 6.27%
Pharmaceutical industry 6.66% 7.58% 5.92%
Instrument and metering production 6.72% 4.43% 4.42%
Paper making and printing, office products 5.36% 6.45% 4.44%
Lodging and restaurant 10.55% 13.28% 8.45%
Comprehensive (including investment) 5.10% 5.47% 5.14%
Leasing and business service 0.95% 4.97% 3.01%
Total 4.83% 4.22% 4.45%
Table 1 and 2 all show that the performance of Chinese large- 
sized private firms, measured by technical efficiency and profit 
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margin, dropped in 2005 and was improved a little bit in 2006, but 
still lower than that of 2004. That is to say, a declining trend is 
obvious of the performance of Chinese large private firms, in terms 
of efficiency and profitability. 
IV. Regression Analysis and Explanation
By constructing regression models, we tested all possible factors 
that may affect the performance of Chinese large-sized private firms 
and listed several variables in the tables that were statistically 
significant. According to the regressions, financing difficulty stands 
out as one of the most important factors that have resulted in the 
decline of technical efficiency and profit margin of Chinese 
large-sized private enterprises since 2003.
Table 3 presents the regression result of the Cobb-Douglas 
production function model. By controlling industry variables, 
financing difficulty has a negative effect on efficiency of firms. This 
effect was not very statistically significant in 2004, but very 
significant in 2005 and 2005, especially in 2005. 
The variables of sources of capital for investment demonstrate 
varied effects. Capital from private borrowing has a statistically 
significant negative effect on efficiency. This implies that firms that 
cannot get bank loans and thus have to rely on private borrowings 
will be adversely affected. Capital directed financed from capital 
market has a statistically significant positive effect on firm’s 
efficiency. Capital from banks shows different effects. In 2005, bank 
loans have no effect on firm efficiency, but in 2006, the effect is 
positive and statistically significant. This implies that it was hard 
for firms to get loans in 2005 and thus their reliance on banks 
was very weak, but in 2006 the situation was improved, and thus 
bank loans have a statistically significant positive effect on firm 
efficiency. 
Financing difficulty is a common problem for Chinese private 
enterprises, but this problem is more severe for small and 
medium-sized private firms than for large ones. However, during 
the 2004-2006 macro control period, the financing situation of large 
private firms also worsened. Even large private firms faced severe 
liquidity constraint. 
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TABLE 3






Coefficient T value Coefficient T value Coefficient T value
Intercept 6.542 48.59 6.316 56.42 6.305 61.41
LNK 0.246 15.03 0.296 20.39 0.307 23.17
LNL 0.269 13.88 0.219 13.08 0.209 13.73
HY1 -0.066 -0.91 0.107 1.82 0.122 2.16
HY2 -0.0116 -0.12 0.223 2.67 0.302 4.05
HY3 -0.0003 -0.00 0.087 0.59 -0.012 -0.10
HY4 -0.0659 -0.51 -0.077 -0.66 -0.147 -1.26
HY5 0.347 4.42 0.525 8.13 0.665 11.15
HY6 0.479 0.81 0.261 3.15 0.417 5.79
HY7 0.083 0.41 0.162 0.12 0.166 1.61
HY8 0.034 0.39 0.079 1.14 0.127 2.01
HY9 -0.323 -2.84 -0.064 -0.67 -0.028 -0.31
HY10 -0.032 -0.24 0.081 0.75 0.065 0.60
HY11 -0.152 -1.74 0.057 0.78 0.032 0.47
HY12 -0.020 -0.19 0.152 1.70 0.095 1.11
HY13 0.194 2.33 0.288 4.26 0.366 6.01
HY14 0.002 0.01 0.353 1.98 0.008 0.04
HY15 -0.054 -0.34 0.093 0.70 0.167 1.11
HY16 -0.504 -2.69 0.335 2.21 -0.060 -0.49
HY17 -0.264 -1.02 -0.099 -0.73 -0.159 -0.86
HY18 0.008 0.09 -0.153 -0.74 0.534 7.84
HY19 0.080 0.31 0.443 6.23 0.051 0.33
HY20 0.399 1.53 0.098 0.46 0.491 1.83
HY21 0.814 9.67 0.584 2.77 1.000 15.16
HY22 -0.141 -0.87 1.136 15.94 0.227 1.76
HY23 -0.700 -2.50 0.162 0.53 0.277 1.10
HY24 0.193 2.00 0.474 5.72 0.381 1.55
HY25 0.115 1.08 0.221 2.32 0.349 4.42
RLZY 0.010 11.01 0.007 8.55 0.008 10.98
Financing -0.051 -1.53 -0.097 -3.23 -0.085 -3.04
Source 1 － － 0.098 3.02 0.016 0.55
Source 2 － － -0.201 -2.39 -0.204 -2.04
Source 3 － － -0.005 -0.15 0.061 2.13
Source 4 － － 0.215 3.91 0.210 5.07
Source 5 － － -0.014 -0.24 -0.022 -0.39
Adj. R-sq. 0.4530 0.4951 0.5080
F value 47.19 63.12 85.69
Observations 1674 2218 2790
Notes: LNY stands for the logarithm of sales revenue, LNK stands for the logarithm of 
fixed asset, LNL stands for the logarithm of number of employees; 
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RLZY stands for proportion of employees with at least a bachelor’s degree, 
Financing stands for those firms who answer that financing is a big problem in 
their development.;
Source 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 stand for firm’s capital for investment coming from self 
deposit, borrowing from private persons, banks, capital market and, and others. 
HY0 stands for food and beverage, which is the benchmark industry. HY1 
stands for textile and chemical fiber industry, HY2 stands for clothing, shoes 
and hat industry, HY3 stands for timber processing, wood, bamboo, vine, palm 
fiber, and grass processing, and furniture making, HY4 stands for paper making 
and printing industry, HY5 stands for black and non-ferrous metal processing, 
HY6 stands for metal products industry, HY7 stands for oil processing industry, 
HY8 stands for chemical materials and chemical products making, HY9 stands 
for pharmaceutical industry, HY10 stands for rubber and plastic industry, HY11 
stands for general and special equipment industry, HY12 stands for 
transportation equipment manufacturing, HY13 stands for electrical machinery 
and equipment industry, HY14 stands for instrument and metering industry, 
HY15 stands for workmanship and other manufacturing industry, HY16 stands 
for ore mining industry, HY17 stands for production and supply of power, gas, 
heat and water, HY18 stands for architecture industry, HY19 stands for 
transportation, warehousing and post industry, HY20 stands for Information 
transmission, computer and other electronic products industry, HY21 stands for 
wholesale and retail, HY22 stands for agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, 
and fishery industry, HY23 stands for lodging and restaurant industry, HY24 
stands for real estate, HY25 stands for comprehensive industries, including 
investment-oriented firms.
The variable of human resource, measured by the proportion of 
employees with at least a bachelor’s degree in a firm, showed a 
statistically significant positive effect on firm efficiency, and this 
effect was very stable in three consecutive years, 2004-2006. This 
shows that human resource is of critical importance for the 
development of Chinese large private firms; and the logic also holds 
conversely ― lack of human resource must be detrimental to firm’s 
further development. According to the annual surveys of ACFIC, 
lack of human resources is universally considered as one of the top 
three biggest problems faced by Chinese large-sized private firms. 
See Table 5.
Table 4 shows the result of regression with profit margin as the 
explained variable. As in Table 3, financing difficulty has a 
statistically significant negative effect on the profit margin of firms 
in 2005 and 2006, although the effect is not very significant in 
2004. Table 3 and 4 both show that capital for investment from 
self-deposit has a statistically significant positive effect on firm’s 
performance in 2005, but not significant in 2006. This may be 
related to the macro control effect in 2005. Since most firms were 
not able to get bank loans, only those firms with relatively  
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TABLE 4
FACTORS AFFECTING PROFIT MARGIN OF CHINESE LARGE-SIZED 






Coefficient T value Coefficient T value Coefficient T value
Intercept 5.117 8.64 6.027 13.74 6.016 15.89
HY1 -0.915 -1.32 -0.975 -2.12 -2.147 -4.83
HY2 0.831 0.94 0.305 0.47 -0.441 -0.76
HY3 0.925 0.61 2.349 2.00 -1.156 -1.21
HY4 -0.335 -0.27 1.759 1.90 -0.968 -1.06
HY5 -0.515 -0.68 -1.223 -2.41 -0.917 -1.96
HY6 -0.649 -0.73 -1.038 -1.60 -2.075 -3.67
HY7 2.95 1.52 -0.082 -0.08 0.087 0.11
HY8 0.360 0.43 1.079 1.99 -0.476 -0.96
HY9 2.983 2.72 3.813 5.11 -0.412 -0.57
HY10 2.307 1.83 -0.780 -0.92 -0.737 -0.88
HY11 0.520 0.62 0.612 1.07 1.279 2.41
HY12 -1.682 -1.55 -0.569 -0.81 -1.047 -1.56
HY13 0.314 0.39 0.656 1.24 -0.744 -1.55
HY14 6.736 2.51 1.297 0.92 0.580 0.40
HY15 -0.816 -0.53 0.569 0.54 -2.729 -2.30
HY16 4.762 2.64 12.571 11.77 5.713 5.91
HY17 3.740 1.50 3.579 2.21 -0.874 -0.60
HY18 -1.004 -0.12 -1.960 -3.71 -0.044 -0.28
HY19 -1.276 -0.51 -0.565 -0.33 -2.292 -1.90
HY20 -1.885 -0.75 1.065 0.65 -1.764 -0.84
HY21 -4.044 -5.12 -3.646 -6.68 -4.837 -9.56
HY22 2.226 1.42 1.233 1.03 -1.883 -1.85
HY23 5.010 1.87 9.658 4.07 1.914 0.98
HY24 3.923 4.27 4.066 6.30 2.178 3.32
HY25 1.688 1.65 0.959 1.29 -0.559 -0.90
RLZY 0.023 2.65 0.016 2.60 0.010 1.75
Financing -0.506 -1.58 -0.830 -3.52 -0.829 -3.76
Source 1 － － 0.464 1.85 0.186 0.81
Source 2 － － -0.101 -0.15 -1.550 -1.96
Source 3 － － -0.199 -0.84 -0.165 -0.74
Source 4 － － 1.108 2.61 1.766 5.55
Source 5 － － 0.126 0.27 0.333 0.76
Adj. R-sq. 0.0737 0.163 0.096
F value 5.76 14.55 10.30
Observations 1677 2228 2791
Note: The same with Table 3.
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abundant self-deposit can have good performance. Then in 2006, 
when the bank credit was loosened, the effect of self-deposit was 
weaker. 8
Table 3 and 4 also both show that capital directly financed from 
capital market has a statistically significant positive effect on both 
efficiency and profit margin of firms. This implies that listed-firms 
are less liquidity constrained by the government’s macro-control 
policy. However, capital from banks has a varied effect on firm 
performance, but bank loans have a stronger effect on firm’s 
efficiency than on profit margin. 
All above regressions show that financing difficulty is one of the 
most important determinants of the performance of Chinese 
large-sized private firms. It leads to, directly or indirectly, the 
decline of performance of Chinese large private firms since 2003. 
The regressions also explain the minor increase of technical 
efficiency in 2006 and a little bit increase in profit margin in 2006. 
If we compare the regression results of 2005 and 2006, the 
variable of capital for investment coming from bank loans 
demonstrates statistically insignificant negative effect on perfor- 
mance in 2005, while the effect is statistically significant in 2006. 
Moreover, the coefficient on financing difficulty variable is smaller 
in 2006 than that of 2005, although both are statistically 
significant negative effect. These facts show that the banks 
loosened credit constraint in 2006, which to some degree improved 
the financing conditions of Chinese large-sized private firms. 
As is known to all, Chinese banks are dominated by four 
state-owned commercial banks. Traditionally they only serve SOEs. 
These state banks are generally reluctant to grant loans to private 
firms, especially small and medium-sized private firms. With the 
commercialization and governance structure reform of the banks, 
since the late 1990s, large private firms can get loans from 
state-owned commercial banks, since they have assets (say, land) 
as mortgages. And banks also want to earn interest from those 
large private firms with good performance. 
But in 2003, the Chinese government believed that the economy 
8 Limited by the data, most of the explanatory variables are dummies. 
Under this circumstance, the R squared is generally not very high. 
Moreover, our main objective is to examine the effect of some special 
variables on profit margin, rather to examine the total effect of whole 
equation. 
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was “over-heated” and inflation was around the corner. In order to 
cool down the economy, the government launched a new round of 
so-called “macro-control.” On August 23, 2003, the People’s Bank 
of China, the central bank, raised the reserve requirement of 
commercial banks from 6 percent to 7 percent with a view of 
contracting bank loans. On April 11, 2004, the central bank further 
raised the reserve requirement by 0.5 percentage point. In April 
2004, the private iron and steel plant under construction in east 
China’s Jiangsu Province was shut down by the central government 
forcefully. And the macro-control policy was then implemented with 
administrative means. Under the control policy, all commercial 
banks, which are still state-owned or state-controlled, were asked to 
cut loans, although implicitly, and reclaimed loans already released. 
But why were large-sized private firms most severely affected in 
the macro-control with an emphasis of credit contracting and loan 
reclaiming? First, large-sized SOEs generally have strong govern- 
mental background, so commercial banks cannot force them to 
repay the loans. Second, for small and medium-sized SOEs, 
reclaiming loans will bring about bankruptcy of them, which is now 
allowed by the governments. Third, for medium and small-sized 
private firms, they generally have little loans from commercial 
banks. Therefore, large-sized private firms became the major target 
of credit contracting of banks. After enjoying some time of relaxed 
credit policy, when forced to repay loans and faced with credit cut, 
theses large private firms’ cash chain was abrupt, and the 
performance was seriously hurt. 
It is beyond doubt that the credit contracting policy worsened the 
financing condition of Chinese large-sized private enterprises. As a 
response to the government’s policy, commercial banks contracted 
credit, cut loans to firms, which resulted in a rupture of many 
large private firms’ cash chain, and in 2004 and 2005, some 
large-sized private enterprises went bankrupt due to the rupture of 
cash chain, and the performance of many other private enterprises 
deteriorated, which are direct results of government’s macro control 
policy. Under the macro-control policy, the credit contracting of 
commercial banks focused on bank loans, which brought about a 
more severe adverse effect on private firms than on SOEs. The 
cutting down loans reduced directly the cash flow of private firms 
and hampered the normal operation of products, which resulted in 
the un-sustainability of private firms.     
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Under the macro-control policy, the bank loan cutting was very 
sudden and was implemented by administrative means, which 
interrupted the normal production plan of firms and decreased 
their output. Lack of working capital resulted in the interruption of 
planned production quota, and the fixed asset cannot be 
apportioned to more output, which brought about higher fixed 
costs. Moreover, the bank credit cutting increased the cost of using 
fluid capital, so firms had to resort to short-term inter-firm loans 
to alleviate the shortage of long-term loans, which pushed up the 
cost of using capital. In addition, cutting down loans resulted in 
many delay payment, and increased the cost of production. In 
short, the high costs are caused by expensive financial cost and 
increased fixed capital cost, which are due to discrimination of 
government policy, instead of uncertainty of market.
Moreover, under the government’s macro-control policy, private 
enterprises’ investment projects in iron and steel, cement, 
aluminum and automobile were also restrained by the government. 
Many undergoing projects in these industries were halted. In the 
macro control period, many small coal mines and power generating 
plants were eradicated. This industry control policy worsened the 
investment environment for large-sized private firms in these 
industries. Of course, the performance in these industries must 
have been harmed.9
Lack of human resource and rising price of raw materials are 
also two factors that may have resulted in the decline of 
performance of Chinese large-sized private enterprises. From the 
surveys, we can see that these two factors, together with financing 
difficulty, constitute the top three obstacles to the development of 
Chinese large-sized private firms. 
Limited by data, we are not able to test the effect of rising price 
of raw materials on firm performance. The effect of lack of human 
resources on firm performance was also tested indirectly. However, 
a lot of observations and cases show that these factors must have 
very important effect on firm performance. This point needs further 
explanation.  
9
One referee claimed that it is hard to understand the quantity 
restrictions like loans cut can cause a decrease in profit margin. This is 
partly because loan cut made it impossible for private firms to invest in 
profitable projects. 
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TABLE 5
MAJOR DIFFICULTIES FACED BY CHINESE LARGE-SIZED PRIVATE ENTERPRISES: 
2003-2006
No. 2003 2004 2005 2006
No. 1




Rising price of raw 
materials (41.3%)






































Source: Arranged from the datasets of ACFIC. 
Why did the price of raw materials rise so dramatically in recent 
two years? We have pointed out that although not confirmed 
directly from the regressions, the rising price of raw materials may 
be another factor that have resulted in the decline of private firm’s 
performance, especially the decline of profit margin in recent years. 
By 2002, most SOEs in competitive industries, especially small and 
medium-sized ones, have been privatized. And now SOEs are 
mainly operating in “upstream industries,” such as coal, oil, ore 
mining, and iron and steel, while private firms are mainly operating 
in “downstream industries,” which are generally labor-intensive 
manufacturing industries. Those upstream industries in which large 
SOEs are operating are generally monopolized. And it is very 
difficult, if not impossible, for private firms to enter these 
industries. 
The “division of industry” between SOEs and private firms in 
China implies that the outputs of SOEs are inputs of private firms. 
After 2004, the monopoly power of SOEs in these resource-oriented 
industries has been increased.10 It should be noted that the 
10 Private firms are discriminated against under the government’s policy. 
Cases abound. Tieben, a large private iron and steel factory was closed 
down when it was under construction, but at the same time, Baogang, a 
state-owned iron and steel factory, was approved to issue shares worth 
RMB 28 billion. Jigang and Wugang, another two state-owned iron and steel 
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monopoly position of SOEs is not the result of fair competition, but 
coming from government protection. The increasing monopoly power 
of SOEs can be illustrated by the extremely rapid growth of their 
profits. In 1998, the profit of all Chinese SOEs was RMB 52.5 
billion, while in 2004, the profit of all state industrial firms reached 
RMB 531.2 billion, with central firms’ profit reached RMB 478.5 
billion increasing by 60 percent compared with that of 2003.11 And 
in 2006, the profit of SOEs reached RMB 1219.3 billion, after tax 
profit was RMB 625.2 billion.12
With rich capital at hand and the implicit support of the 
government, Chinese large SOEs expanded their sphere in many 
industries, especially iron and steel, coal and oil, in recent years. 
SOEs merged and acquired many private firms in these industries, 
which made SOE’s monopoly power in these industries increase 
dramatically. It is beyond doubt that they will charge a higher price 
for their products. And private firms are not allowed to enter into 
these upper-stream industries. Of course, the soaring price of raw 
materials for private firms have other reasons, such as the rising of 
international oil price, the rising of land price also due to macro 
control policy of the government, the rising coal and power price 
due to the shutting-down a lot of small coal mines and power- 
generating plants in the macro control. And of course, the labor 
price also increases significantly in recent years, and this is also  
bad news for private enterprises, which are generally operating in 
labor-intensive industries. This explains why rising price of raw 
materials was listed as the No. 1 difficulty faced by Chinese 
large-sized private enterprises in 2005 and 2006. See Table 5.  
Why were private firms so constrained by human resource in 
recent years? In the 1990s, human resources of Chinese private 
firms mainly came from their state-owned counterparts. At that 
time, SOEs covered almost all industries, both competitive and 
monopolized. Then the income of private firms, which were 
determined by the market, was much higher than that of SOEs. 
One important reason was that under fierce market competition, 
private firms outperformed SOEs under the same industries. There 
factories, were approved to be listed on the stock market. It was very hard, 
if not impossible, for new private iron and steel factories to be approved. 
11
Data source: http://opinion.people.com.cn/GB/1034/3341137.html.  
12
Data source: http://finance.sina.com.cn/g/20070914/18213980500.shtml.  
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is small wonder that many talents, especially technicians and 
engineers, resigned from SOEs and joined private firms. 
Then beginning from the mid of 1990s to the beginning of the 21 
century, almost all small and medium-sized SOEs in competitive 
industries were privatized. SOEs are more and more concentrated 
in monopoly industries. The income and benefits of employees in 
SOEs now are much better than that of private firms, and it is no 
longer easy to absorb talents from SOEs. Moreover, Chinese private 
firms, which are generally family-owned, have not established a 
mature and standardized governance structure and corporate 
culture, which makes it less competitive for many people than 
foreign firms. Many private firms, especially in less-developed 
regions, cannot attract high-caliber people easily. 
V. Conclusion
In this paper, we did a research based on 2000-3000 Chinese 
large-sized private enterprises surveyed by ACFIC from 2004 to 
2006, and measured the change of performance in terms of 
technical efficiency and profit margin of them. We find that from 
2004 to 2006, there was an obvious decreasing trend of 
performance for these large private firms. The trough occurred in 
2005, and it recovered a little bit in 2006, but still worse than that 
of 2004. 
With a view of figuring out the underlying determinants for the 
decreasing of performance, we constructed two multiple regression 
models, and tested factors that might have resulted in the change 
of performance of Chinese large private firms. The regression 
results showed that the most important determinant is financing 
difficulty faced by these enterprises. Financing difficulty had a 
statistically significant negative effect on performance of firms. Such 
effects were very stable in three consecutive years, and especially in 
2005 there were most obvious and significant negative ones. 
Meanwhile, different sources of capital for investment also had 
important effects on firm performance. Firms that can obtain bank 
loans or finance from the capital market generally had good 
performance. However, the positive effect of bank loans did not 
exist in 2005, which implied that it was hard for firms, regardless 
of their performance, to get bank loans then.  
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Therefore, the decrease of performance of Chinese large-sized 
private firms is by no means an accident, nor is it the result of 
business cycle fluctuation, but is closely related to the 
macro-control policy of the government with an emphasis of credit 
contracting started in 2003. In order to meet the target of 
contracting credit, commercial banks forcefully reclaim bank loans 
released to large-sized private firms, no matter whether the loans 
were due or undue, and no matter how firms performed. This 
discrimination policy against private firms resulted in the rupture 
of cash chain of many private firms. Under these circumstances, 
the decline of performance is unavoidable. The empirical analysis in 
this paper confirmed this hypothesis. 
The Chinese government can, to a great extent, determine the 
cycle of the Chinese economy, due to its powerful control over 
finance and the capital market. Economic fluctuations due to 
government policies (non-economic factors) have occurred several 
times during the economic development of China since the reform 
and opening up in late 1970s. These economic fluctuations do not 
result from market forces, but from government intervention, which 
tend to have some harmful effect on the healthy development of 
market economy. Private firms are major players of market 
economy, whose healthy development not only relates to benefits of 
themselves, but more importantly, relates to the foundation of the 
national economy. And the healthy development of private 
enterprises also has some bearing with the successful transition of 
economic growth pattern of China, namely, from an extensive 
pattern to an intensive one, and with the employment of most 
people and social welfare. The healthy development of Chinese 
private enterprises affects the healthy operation and development of 
the entire Chinese economy. If private capital is seriously curbed in 
the production area, the adverse effect will be transmit to other 
markets, such as real estate and financial market, and if so, 
economic bubble will be inevitable, and which will affect the stable 
development and equilibrium of the Chinese economy. 
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Comments and Discussion
Comments by Byung-Yeon Kim*13
 
This paper has two main purposes. It aims at explaining the 
extent to which technical efficiency and profit margin of Chinese 
enterprises have decreased and identifying factors that determine 
such changes, with having the latter as a main focus. It uses data 
from surveys of All China Federation of Industry and Commerce 
that include firm level data from 2004 to 2006. Firms' performance 
was measured using data envelope analysis (Farrell technical 
efficiency) and profit margin. In addition, standard regression 
method was used to identify determinants of firms' performance 
having sales revenue or profit margin as a dependent variable.  
The key findings of this paper can be summarized as follows: 
Firms’ performance has decreased substantially in 2005 compared 
to 2004; Such a decrease is affected by macro control policies that 
intensified financial constraints of firms; Firms financed from 
capital market performed best, followed by bank-financed or 
self-financed firms.  
This paper is interesting and has potential for extension. It 
appears to be possible to add some contribution to the literature 
not only on Chinese firms but also on financial hierarchy.
 
Having said that, I have some concerns about econometric or 
data problems, namely, sample selection bias and some problems 
in interpretation. As regards sample selection bias, the number of 
samples varies across years, making meaningful comparisons 
difficult (2199, 2688, and 3191 in 2004, 2005, and 2006, 
respectively). The paper suggests that annual sales revenue 
exceeding RMB200 million was used as a threshold. If this 
threshold is not inflation adjusted, smaller firms, possibly less 
* Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Seoul National University, 
Seoul 151-746,  Korea, (Tel) +82-2-880-6370, (E-mail) kimby@snu.ac.kr. 
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efficient, began to be included over time, which may result in 
biases in estimates. The authors should consider using only firms 
that survived throughout the period in order to eliminate such a 
bias.   
This paper explains macro control policies that cut loans and 
reclaimed loans already released. Yet, it is hard to understand that 
such quantity restrictions caused a decrease in profit margin 
(quantity restrictions will decrease sales revenue as well as costs 
simultaneously). The authors need to give a more detailed 
explanation on such policies. (If macro control policies involved 
raising interest rates on loans, profit margin would have decreased 
for firms with financial constraints). 
The authors need to think about their main findings from the 
perspective on ‘financial hierarchy’ literature (eg. Fazzari, S., 
Hubbard, G., and Petersen, B., “Financing Constraints and 
Corporate Investment,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, vol. 
1, 1988, pp. 141-195; Hubbard, G., “Capital-Market Imperfections 
and Investment,” Journal of Economic literature, vol. 34, 1998, pp. 
193-225). This literature has been advocated where: internal funds, 
new debt, and new equity represent progressively higher cost of 
financing. However, the findings do not square with such literature. 
Given financial constraints, one would expect that the order of 
performance is source 1 (self deposits) > source 3 (borrowing from 
banks) > source 4 (capital markets) …. Yet the order this paper 
suggests is source 4 > source 1 > … source 2 (borrowing from 
private persons). It would be worth explaining why the findings of 
this paper are not in line with those suggested by ‘financial 
hierarchy’ literature. In fact, linking this paper with literature on 
financial hierarchy will be an interesting avenue to explore.
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Comments by Donghoon Hahn*14
 
1. This paper analyzes the reason why Chinese large-sized 
enterprises have recently been suffering from poor performances. I 
think this tipic subject is very timely, and reminds me of the 
massive bankruptcy of the Township-and-Village collective enterprises 
around the time of Tiananmen Incident in the late 1980s.  
Moreover, it seems that this subject is closely related with the so 
called ‘revival of the Chinese SOEs' debate. The engine of growth 
for Chinese economy has been being changed from collective 
enterprises to private enterprises. But in these years, the perfor- 
mance of Chinese private enterprises have deteriorated, which is a 
rather unexpected matter. And at the same time, as the SOEs have 
been showing superior performances, people began to think of the 
SOEs as a viable form of ownership under the condition of the 
market economy, the so called ‘revival of the SOEs'. This paper 
shows us that the revival of the SOEs is closely related with the 
downfall of the private enterprises. That is to say, a big part of the 
good performances of the SOEs has been attained by the sacrifice 
of the private enterprises.
2. This paper did empirical works on Chinese private enterprises.  
As the authors say, there are many papers on Chinese private 
enterprises but there are few papers that did empirical works.  
Although the data of this paper is confined to recent 3 years, but 
when we consider the low availability of the firm-level data, I think 
that it is not an easy job to do. It may be said to be one of the 
contributions of this paper. 
3. Talking on data and methodology, I wonder why the authors 
used the ratio of net profit divided by sales revenue to measure the 
profitability. I think that it is not a very good measure of 
profitability because this indicator does not contain the information 
on firm size, and moreover I think if you conduct empirical work 
using this indicator, it is very likely to arouse industry bias 
problem because this indicator reflects the profitability of the 
* Associate Professor, School of International Studies, The Catholic 
University of Korea, Seoul, Korea, (E-mail) dhhahn@catholic.ac.kr. 
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industry that a certain firm belongs to. I suggest the authors to 
use the indicator ROE or ROA instead. ROE is better than ROA, if 
you don't have the firm equity data, ROE would be the second- 
best.
4. In table 4, the adjusted R-square values are too small for all 
the three years, so I think you should find some more explanatory 
variables, for example input material price indicators. According to 
the firm survey result you used, the rise of raw material prices 
became the No. 1 difficulty that private firms face. But the authors 
did not include this variable in the regression.
5. For the empirical works that you did in Tables 3 and 4, I 
wonder if you dealt with the listed firms and non-listed firms 
separately. The authors used the variable 'direct financing from the 
stock market' as one of the explanatory variables, but the 
non-listed firms can not have access to the direct financing. So, I 
think you have to take this factor into account. 
6. The authors suggested the macro-control and the resulting 
weak accessibility to financial resources as one of the most 
important factors to explain the poor performance of the private 
enterprises. However, I think that there are not presented sufficient 
evidences about how strong the macro-control measures were. The 
authors just wrote that the central bank raised the reserve 
requirement of commercial banks two times. Could you please give 
provide more evidences?
7. The authors suggested the rise of raw material prices as one 
of the factors to explain sudden deterioration of private firms' 
performances. The authors explain the rise of raw material prices 
by the strengthening of monopoly power of the upstream industry 
SOEs. But there are not provided enough evidences. The authors 
wrote that Chinese large SOEs merged many private firms in the 
industries producing raw materials, and that many small private 
coal mines and power-generating plants were shut down by the 
government. However, I wonder how much influence these measures 
could have on the sudden rise of overall raw material prices. 
8. Finally, I would like to ask the author to add some prospects 
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on the future development of the large private enterprises, 
especially prospects of the variables the author included in the 
regression. 

